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NRO & USAF REVIEWS  
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Copy 1 of 6

5 March 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director (Plans)  
THROUGH : Chief, Development Projects Division  
SUBJECT : Project CORONA  
(AFCIN, Awareness by Unauthorized Personnel)  
REFERENCE : DPS-5070 - 2 December 1958  
DPS-5393 - 6 November 1958

25X1 1. Due to our absence from the D.C. area, it has been difficult for [ ] and I to review his reported awareness of the CORONA Program.

2. On 27 February we met and discussed this matter at length. He explained his apparent awareness of CORONA as follows:

(a) No specific person advised him of the existence of CORONA as originally seemed to be the case.

(b) He acquired the impression that a satellite project was being conducted by this Agency (yourself) for the following reasons:

(1) The Air Force stopped its effort to develop a Follow-on aircraft.

(2) The Air Force dropped its most promising reconnaissance mechanism, the recovery capsule feature within WS-117L.

(3) ARPA, in the persons of [ ]  
[ ] Captain Robert Truax,  
25X1 contacted [ ] as Chairman of Requirements for  
WS-117L and talked with him regarding requirements  
vital during 1959.

(4) As a member of the "Phil Strong Committee" assessing satellite reconnaissance, [ ] was privy  
25X1 to the recommendation that such reconnaissance be  
accomplished in the immediate future via a recoverable  
satellite.

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25X1 (5) [ ] participation in ARC and his close contact with intelligence collection methods and sources made him sensitive to the probability that this Agency was directly concerned with a recoverable reconnaissance satellite.

25X1 3. The above was [ ] explanation for his leading questioning of Mr. Reber regarding the "most recent Bissell project." It is my view that we have here an accumulation of awareness [ ] acquired through several sources (AFCIN, ARPA and WS-117L), and he skillfully surfaced the subject when he felt the interest of the intelligence community, and AFCIN in particular, warranted his probing the issue.

4. I feel this situation can't be resolved further. However, it does point out a hypersensitiveness within the intelligence community that must be recognized and taken into account whenever a maximum compartmentation effort is contemplated. I plan no further action.



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